Abstract: Previous studies agree that cooperation among participants is critical to successfully 4 deliver projects; however, little research has quantitatively illustrated how participants benefit from 5 cooperation. Based on partnering and cooperative game theories, the Degree of Willingness to 6
Introduction

24
Multi-organizational dynamics during project delivery have increasingly become research emphases 25 as project participants' objectives, resources, and management structures are partly shared and 26 closely interacted with each other (Lehtiranta 2014) . Project delivery involves a range of participants 27 such as clients, designers, superintendents and contractors, and their specific interests in project 28 outcomes may lead to conflict resulting in poor quality, delays and cost overruns ; 29 Tang et al. 2007 ). Lack of synergy between project organizations is identified as a key obstacle to the 30 implementation and efficient delivery of projects (Ates and Durakbasa 2012). As traditional 31 competitive ways may make multi-organizational relationships adversarial, which ultimately has a 32 negative impact on project delivery, cooperative strategies need to be adopted by project participants 33 (Palacios et al. 2013 ). Many researchers advocate using the strategy of partnering that applies a 34 win-win philosophy to enhance the cooperation between participants (Hong et al. 2012; Lubell et al. 35 2002). Partnering is a long-term commitment between two or more organizations for the purpose of 36 achieving specific objectives by maximizing the effectiveness of each participant's resources based 37 upon trust relationships (CII 1991) . Partnering has been increasingly applied to improving the 38 performance of project delivery during the past two decades. The success of partnering can be 39 attributed to: firstly, partnering promotes participants' willingness to form an integrated project team 40 mechanism (Cho et al. 2010 ; Tang et al. 2006 ; Growley and Karim 1995) . Nevertheless, detailed 48 quantifiable models that systematically evaluate how participants benefit from cooperation are 49 lacking, and this may restrict a deeper understanding of partnering quintessence and weaken 50 management resolve to pursue partnering ; Tang et al. 2006 ). Thus, the objective of 51 this study is to quantitatively investigate how degree of willingness to cooperate, associated with use 52 of incentives, impact on the rewards of participants, by validating the outcomes of the Degree of 53
Willingness to Cooperate (DWC) model simulation with the support of data collected from a 54 fieldwork survey of hydropower industry in Southwest China. 55 The DWC Model
56
Background 57
Game theories have been used to study the conflict and cooperation between rational 58 decision-makers (Owen 1995; Myerson 1991) , which provide useful insights into the way 59 participants plan and utilize the scarce resources they share together under different situations 60 (Parrachino et al. 2006 ). Different from non-cooperative game theories, cooperative game theories 61 facilitate fair allocation of coalitional gains by modeling the decision-making processes of multiple 62 environment, economic gains and special interest groups have been used to reach a more equitable 64 distribution of payoffs among participants and improve the effectiveness of sharing information 65 degrees of willingness to cooperate (DWCs), the use of incentives and the payoffs of cooperation 84
Model Details 86
To calculate the influence of historical factors on participants' DWCs in simulating the process of 87 cooperation among project participants, participants' expected payoff and actual payoff need to be 88 considered. In the long-term reciprocally cooperative moves between participants, the comparisons 89 between previous cooperation's expected payoffs and actual payoffs are historical factors, which 90 have impacts on the participants' DWCs in the next period (Kadefors 2004 
where =project development environment factor's weight in expected payoff; 111 1 para i =historical factor's weight in expected payoff; e -(t-k) =attenuation index of historical factor's 112 influence on expected payoff; ω i (k =weight of the difference between actual payoff and expected 113 payoff in period k, which is calculated as Eq. (4): 114
The DWC value in next period is calculated as Eq. (5): 115
where para (i+6) =historical factor's weight in DWC value of next period; 1 116 para (i+6) =cognition factor's weight in DWC value of next period; para (i+8) =project development 117 environment factor's weight in DWC value of next period; 1 para (i+8) =project development 118 contingency factor's weight in DWC value of next period; and
. 119
Inferences from the DWC Model Simulation 120
To start the simulation, an initial payoff matrix of two participants was set in Table 1 Table 2 . 137
The results in Table 2 show that when initial DWCs of the two participants are both 1, the actual 138 Further, incentives were studied in the DWC model to quantitatively explore how they affect 146 cooperation rewards of participants. The initial payoff matrix of two participants with incentives was 147 set as shown in Table 3 . 148
The main reason for introducing incentives into the cooperation processes is that project 149 rewards should be more equitably shared among participants so that a more proactively partnering 150 relationship could be created for achieving superior performance (Tang et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2008 ; 151 Bower et al. 2002; Scott 2001) . Accordingly, the initial payoff matrix (see Table 3 ) was changed to 152 alleviate the imbalance of the payoff allocation, and when the two participants take different 153 strategies, the one adopting cooperative strategy has payoff increased from 10 to 15, whereas the 154 other one adopting competitive strategy has payoff decreased from 40 to 35. Based on the changed 155 initial values in Table 3 , payoffs of two participants with incentives were calculated in the DWC 156 model, with the results shown in Table 4 . 157
The payoffs in Table 4 being 18200MW, 12600MW and 8400MW respectively. In total, 268 questionnaires were collected, 223 and the distribution is: 44% from clients, 29% from constructors, 20% from superintendents and 7% 224 from designers. Among the respondents, 30% held senior positions, such as project manager, chief 225 engineer, department head, general manager and director, and the rest also had been working in the 226 hydropower industry for many years. The fieldwork approach assisted that all the sent questionnaires 227 had been collected. 228
The fieldwork in this study allowed that interviews with 67 respondents holding senior positions 229 were conducted after the questionnaires had been completed, and the themes in the questionnaire 230 were used as interview topics. Direct observation during site visits also improved the researchers' 231 understanding of the environment and construction process of the hydropower projects, which 232 objectively demonstrates the need for participants to cooperatively deal with them. Some project 233 documents were reviewed to know how cooperative strategies were applied by participants in details. 234
In addition, a case study of the Three Gorges Project (TGP) was undertaken for in-depth analysis of 235 using incentives. 236
Questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data for validating the hypotheses from the DWC 237 model simulation. Interview, direct observation, project document review, and case study were 238 applied to further interpret the established relationships, and unfold the cooperation status of 239 hydropower development in Southwest China. Given the variety of respondents, the methodological 240 triangulation approach, and the significance of hydropower projects together with their geographic 241 distribution, the bias of sample selecting could be reasonably reduced in this study. 242
Data Analysis Techniques 243
The data collected from questionnaires were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social 244 Respondents were asked to rate the importance of the project objectives, where 1=not important, and 261 5=most important. The results are shown in Table 5 . 262
Overall, "safety" and "quality" objectives were found to be the most important, which obtained 263 apparently high ratings of 4.64 and 4.59 respectively, as shown in Table 5 . "Schedule", "cost", 264 "ecology and environment" and "resettlement of migrants" objectives had considerably high ratings 265 (≥ 3.92), demonstrating these aspects are also worthy of participants' concerns. ANOVA was 266 performed to test whether the participants' perceptions are equal (SPSS 1997) . The ANOVA analysis 267 results show that all groups have a common view on the criticality of "safety" and "quality", 268 providing sound basis for participants to collaboratively deal with problems related to natural 269 hazards, unforeseen geological conditions, application of complex technologies and construction 270 processes. However, there are disparities among the participants' perceptions on the other four 271 objectives, suggesting the need for participants to establish alignment mechanisms, e.g. use of 272 incentives, to promote the synergy among the participants in tackling issues on "schedule", "cost", 273 "ecology and environment" and "resettlement of migrants". 274
To explore the relationship between the participants' cooperative willingness and the outcomes 275 of cooperation, respondents were asked to score their degrees of willingness to cooperate with the 276 other partners ranging from 1 to 5, where 1=extremely unwilling, and 5=extremely willing; and to 277 rate the cooperation gains ranging from 1 to 5, where 1=minimally beneficial, and 5=maximally 278 beneficial. The results are shown in Table 6 . 279
As presented in Table 6 Table 2 ): DWCs have positive impacts on the participants' cooperation gains. 287
Further, respondents were asked to score the frequency of using incentives in the cooperation 288 with other partners ranging from 1 to 5, where 1=not applied, and 5=always applied. They were also 289 required to rate the reward improvement from using incentives, ranging from 1 to 5, where 290 1=insignificant improvement and 5=significant improvement. The results are shown in Table 7 . 291
As seen in Table 7 , contractors are the partners that clients, superintendents and designers most 292 frequently apply incentives to (score=3.57), correspondingly the reward improvement from 293 contractors is the most significant (score=3.44). The correlations between the frequencies of using 294 incentives and the reward improvements are calculated, as shown in Column 4 of Table 7 . The 295 frequencies of using incentives are closely correlated with the reward improvements at the 0.01 level, 296 validating the influence of using incentives on cooperation rewards considered in the DWC model, 297 which can interpret the simulated results (see Table 4 ): use of incentives contributes to improving the 298 rewards of cooperation between participants. 299
In general, the relationships in the DWC model have been tested and confirmed on the basis of 300 the survey results. To more specifically understand the cause-effect relationships between 301 cooperative behaviors, use of incentives and cooperation gains, the survey results were incorporated 302 into the DWC model to evaluate the status of cooperation among the participants of hydropower 303 project delivery in Southwest China. 304
The Cooperation Status of Hydropower Development in Southwest China
305
The respondents' survey results were converted to values ranging from -1 to 1 for use in the DWC 306 model, with the cooperation payoffs of participants in pairwise classification shown in Table 8 . 307
As shown in Table 8 , clients and designers have the highest average DWC (score=0.82), 308 correspondingly their overall payoff (score=30.21) is the highest, which are largely attributed to 309 designers' key role in technical issues of hydropower developments. Interviews show that, on the one 310 hand, many hydropower projects in Southwest China have high dams (e.g. exceeding 300m) and 311 complex geologic conditions that pose significant technical challenges to the designers, on the other 312 hand, clients tend to urge designers to complete the detailed design as soon as possible for early 313 electricity generation. These frequently result in inadequate and incorrect design of the work. A high 314 degree of cooperation between clients and designers is essential for discussing problems that 315 designers may encounter, aligning the objectives of the two participants and optimally sharing the 316 necessary resources, which can bring high overall payoff by reducing design-related problems such 317 as variations, poor quality, reworks, delays, disputes and claims. 318
Compared to other pairs as shown in Table 8 , contractors and designers have the lowest average 319 DWC (score=0.54), with the overall payoff (score=27.91) being the lowest. This is due to both the 320 objective misalignments of the two participants and the management structure of the industry. There 321 are significant disparities on the importance of cost and schedule objectives between contractors and 322 designers (see Table 5 ). Interviews during fieldtrips confirm that contractors emphasize the 323 achievement of cost and schedule objectives much more than designers for financial considerations. 324
Interviews also reveal that, contractors and designers having no hierarchical relationship in project 325 management structure resulted in lacking formal communication channels between them, which can 326 further influence their overall payoff of cooperation. Nevertheless, contractors and designers have 327 similar priorities on the importance of quality and safety objectives (see Table 5 ), which provides a 328 sound base for them to jointly improve constructability, value engineering and timely feedback of 329 site conditions by establishing informal communication channels, thereby they still can obtain 330 considerable overall payoff of cooperation. 331
As indicated in Table 8 , clients are the ones with whom contractors, superintendents and 332 designers have the generally highest degrees of willingness to cooperate, with the scores being 0.78, 333 0.90 and 0.87 respectively. Generally, DWC scores to designers, superintendents and contractors 334 rank the second, third and fourth. These reflect the positions of the participants in Southwest China 335 hydropower project developments. Clients dominate the whole business chain of hydropower 336 projects during their life cycle and they largely direct the resource allocation involving the work of 337 designers, superintendents and contractors, whereas contractors need to meet the requirements of 338 clients, designers and superintendents during project delivery processes. 339
To further understand the impacts of incentives, the respondents' frequencies of using incentives 340 collected from the survey are reflected in the change of Payoff Matrix in the DWC model. As a key 341 rationale of introducing incentives to cooperation processes is that project rewards should be 342 equitably shared among participants (Tang et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2008; Bower et al. 2002; Scott 343 2001), it was set that equally allocating payoff between two participants corresponds to the highest 344 rating of using incentives (score=5). On this basis, the payoffs were adjusted according to the 345 incentive ratings by respondents (see Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 9 ). The cooperation outcomes 346 of participants with incentives in pairwise classification are shown in Table 9 . 347
The results in Table 9 demonstrate that the overall payoffs of the project participants change with 348 the level of using incentives. The more frequently incentives are used (see Column 2 of Table 9), the 349 higher the overall payoffs are improved (see Column 6 of Table 9 = Column 5 of Table 9 -350
Column 5 of Table 8 ). This demonstrates incentives' influence in promoting the cooperation rewards 351 of project participants. 352
As shown in Table 9 , levels of using incentives among clients, superintendents and contractors 353 are higher than those involving designers. This indicates that incentives are mainly applied in the 354 construction phase of hydropower project developments, aiming at improving the performance of 355 executing processes that are largely implemented by contractors. The case study of Three Gorges 356
Project on using incentives at the construction stage can explain this. 357
Multiple incentive schemes with different weights were adopted in the TGP to align the 358 objectives between clients and contractors, including incentives of quality (weight=45%), schedule 359 (24%), occupational health and safety (OH & S) and environment (15%), information management 360 (10%), and coordination (6%), which had various measures to decide appropriate rewards. Besides, a 361 value engineering incentive was also put in place to promote innovation for project cost saving, and 362 the cost saving from a value engineering proposal presented by a contractor was to be shared by the 363 client and the contractor in the proportion of 50:50. These incentives had incorporated measures 364 extending from project results to construction processes, which facilitated continuous improvement 365 by providing early warnings and encouraged participants to share needed information for optimal 366 decision-making and innovation. Specifically, the incentives ensured that the contractors had 367 motivation and necessary resources to accomplish the tasks assigned by the client and 368 superintendents in a cooperative manner. The outcomes of the TGP implementation confirm the 369 effectiveness of using the incentives. The cooperation relationships among involved project 370 participants have been well established; The safety incidents decreased continuously; The specified 371 project quality had met the required standards that ensure the TGP's main functions of power 372 generation, navigation and flood control; The project development progress had strictly met the 373 project delivery schedule of 17 years; The total cost of the project was RMB 173.1 billion (US$ 27.8 374 billion), 15% less than budget of RMB 203.9 billion (US$ 32.8 billion). These bring a large amount 375 of payoffs to the client such as project cost saving, yearly income of RMB 21 billion (US$ 3.4 billion) 376 from generating power of 84.68 billion kwh, and obtaining the permission from government to 377 develop other major hydropower projects. The rewards of contractors from incentives can reach 3% 378 of the value of completed work, which is a significant payoff improvement to the contractors. In 379 addition, successful implementation of the TGP harvests good reputation that is an important 380 intangible payoff for the contractors to expand their market share, e.g. the contractors with high 381 performance in the TGP also won the bids of hydropower projects in Jinsha River developed by the 382 client of the TGP. 383
Comparatively, the frequencies of using incentives involving designers are relatively low (see 384   Table 9 ), demonstrating incentives are less applied in the design phase than in the construction phase. 385
Although clients and designers have the highest average DWC and also have the highest overall 386 payoff (see Table 8 ), the level of using incentives between them to improve the cooperation rewards 387 is the lowest (score = 2.98, see Table 9 ), which is attributed to the factors related to market, technical 388 complexity and clients' inadequate recognition of key issues of project developments. Firstly, with 389 the increasing demand for energy, much more hydropower projects are being developed than before 390 in Southwest China, resulting in that the designers normally are overloaded. In these circumstances, 391
clients' incentives cannot create the effects as expected, due to designers being unable to allocate 392 additional resources to fulfil the objectives of incentives such as earlier completion of design. 393
Secondly, because of the technical complexity of the hydropower projects in Southwest China, it is 394 difficult for clients to measure designers' performance on adequacy of design and value for money of 395 selected option, to decide appropriate rewards in incentives. Thirdly, clients tend to focus on 396 engineering issues related to construction, and lack the intention of using incentives for designers to 397 conduct in-depth studies on other issues such as resettlement of migrants, ecology and environment 398 at an early stage. This is in line with the survey results (see Table 5 ), in which resettlement of 399 migrants, ecology and environment objectives are less important than safety, quality, schedule and 400 cost objectives perceived by project participants. 401
However, resettlement of migrants and the issues related to ecology and environment have 402 become main restrictions on hydropower project developments. For example, in the TGP it was 403 accounted for 44.4% of the total budget, whereas 1.25 million affected residents have been relocated 405 during the 17 years of project development, and the migrants resettlement costs have increased to be 406 about 50% of the project costs. The costs of resettling migrants were mainly spent on compensations, 407 hiring relocation lands, developing new communities, building infrastructure, and improving 408 migrants' skills for sustainable living. Environment impacts are also important to the TGP, e.g. RMB 409
11.3 billion (US$1.8 billion) was spent on the geological hazard prevention and treatment in the 410 reservoir area. In total, 2,874 high-cut slopes and 441 locations prone to landslide were technically 411 treated; 175km of reservoir bank protection was delivered; 3,113 public monitoring points 412 concerning 600 thousands of residents were established for early warning; 69,900 residents were 413 relocated from the 646 communities affected by geological hazards. In addition, water storages of the 414 TGP and other hydropower projects in Southwest China have importantly ecological impacts on the 415 downstream areas of Yangtze River such as Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake. To reduce the high 416 social, environmental and economic costs, the above themes also need to be incorporated into 417 incentive schemes at an early stage for promoting designers to adequately conduct study in advance 418 of construction phase, by which improving the level of using incentives in design phase to increase 419 the overall payoff of hydropower project developments. 420 between them should be a management emphasis, which assists clarifying clients' intentions, 434 discussing problems that designers encounter, and jointly dealing with key engineering issues of 435 hydropower project developments. However, the low level of using incentives between clients and 436 designers suggests that the factors on market, technical complexity and clients' inadequate 437 recognition of hydropower developments have restricted deeper cooperation between them. Clients 438
Practical Strategies for Cooperative Management
should input more at early stages by developing and using suitable incentives, to motivate designers 439 to conduct in-depth study in detailed design phase by optimally sharing the relevant resources of the 440 two participants. The incentive schemes involving design need to not only consider engineering 441 technical challenges but also emphasize social and environmental issues. In addition, applicable 442 design measurements should be incorporated into the incentive schemes for clients to evaluate the 443 extent to which designers perform in achieving the set objectives, to promote selection of cost 444 effective options, and more importantly, to ensure the adequacy of hydropower project design. 445
Applying Incentives to Construction Processes in Achieving Superior Performance 446
Although cooperation can bring payoffs to project participants, their DWCs are different, which is 447 originated from the objective misalignments of them as shown in Table 5 . The practice of TGP 448 demonstrates the effectiveness of using incentives in construction phase to align the objectives of 449 clients and contractors. This suggests that appropriate incentives need to be developed and applied in 450 project implementation, which should follow the partnering principle of equitably sharing project 451 rewards in dealing with the different priorities between clients and contractors. The incentives 452 involving construction should have measures that are not only tied to implementation results but also 453 extended to the whole construction process, which facilitate providing early warnings, obtaining 454 continuous improvement, and ultimately achieving project goals. 455
Fostering a Trust Relationship between Contractors and Designers by Creating Open 456
Communication Mechanism 457
Contractors and designers have the lowest DWC, with the overall payoff being the lowest, owing to 458 their significant disparities on the cost and schedule objectives (see Table 5 of the other project participants; 2) Clients and designers have the highest DWC, correspondingly 500 their overall payoff is the highest, demonstrating that high extent of cooperation between them can 501 bring high benefits by reducing design-related problems such as variations, poor quality, reworks, 502 delays, disputes and claims; 3) Contractors and designers have the lowest DWC, with the overall 503 payoff being the lowest, which is due to the two participants' significant disparities on the cost and 504 schedule objectives, and their ineffective links in the hierarchical project management structure; 4) 505 Levels of using incentives among clients, superintendents and contractors are higher than those 506 between designers and the above three participants, indicating that incentives are mainly applied in 507 the construction phase of hydropower project developments. The outcomes of the TGP 508 implementation demonstrate the effectiveness of using incentives in improving the contractors' 509 performance of the project implementation; 5) Incentives are less applied in the design phase than in 510 the construction phase, which is attributed to designers' resource restriction due to overloaded work, 511 technical complexity and clients' inadequate recognition of key issues of hydropower developments. 512
The insights obtained in this research suggest broad practical strategies for inter-organizational 513 cooperation in project delivery, which include: 1) promoting cooperation among project participants 514 by partnering approach; 2) inputting more at early stages for designers to conduct in-depth project 515 study; 3) applying incentives to construction processes in achieving superior performance; 4) 516 fostering a trust relationship between contractors and designers by creating open communication 517 mechanism; 5) equitable sharing of the rewards between project stakeholders. 518
Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 519
This study advances the area of multi-organizational dynamics during project delivery adopting 520 win-win philosophy, which has important contributions to the body of knowledge from both 521 theoretical and practical perspectives. First, it builds interdisciplinary linkage between partnering 522 theory and cooperative game theory, providing a structure to quantify the impact of DWCs, 523 associated with use of incentives, on the rewards of participants. Second, the empirical study reveals 524 the mutual goals and different priorities of project participants, unfolds the cause-effect relationships 525 between cooperative behaviors and incentives, and answers questions on how coalitions can be 526
formed and how cooperation gains should be equitably allocated, to ensure participants' proper 527 distribution of resources in jointly delivering projects. Third, the findings can help practitioners to 528 understand their positions in cooperation, make decisions taking account of optimally integrating 529 participants' resources, and find ways to reach stable long-term partnering relationships from the 530 perspective of Pareto optimum solutions during project delivery. 531
Limitations and Future Research Directions 532
The principal limitation of this research lies in that all the samples are from the hydropower industry 533 of Southwest China. Nevertheless, the theory building derived from this study has incorporated 534 experience from different regions via literature, and the findings appear transferable to industries 535 elsewhere in the world. Further study needs to test this. Moreover, the study on cooperative 536 behaviours has focused on only DWC together with its effects, and further study can add other 537 variables such as trust into the cooperation model, to draw a broader picture on how improvements 538 may be obtained from cooperation among project participants. Future research should also be 539 conducted on how to motivate value-engineering and innovation in advance of project 540 implementation, establish joint early warning system during project delivery, and facilitate 541 participants' proper inputting necessary resources to each other's management processes, which are 542 on the basis of equitable reward allocations. 543 
